

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

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NOTE FOR: Herb Meyer  
VC/NIC

FROM : MG Atkeson  
NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : The Role of the DCI

Continuing our conversation on the subject,  
you may or may not have seen the attached--  
extracted from   The Armies of  
Ignorance. (I am not sure just who they are,  
even after reading the book, but I think the  
conclusions are sound.)

  
Edward B. Atkeson

Attachment

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work record became lost in the course of the trial. Another strange fact emerged: that six weeks before Moore threw the documents into the Soviet compound, his \$2,057.68 debt at the CIA's Northwest Federal Credit Union was mysteriously paid off by an unknown source. This transaction was never satisfactorily explained. Moore claimed the Agency did it, in effect giving him the money as compensation for planting the documents at Tunlaw Road, but a CIA credit union official denied the charge without explaining how the debt was cancelled.

Another major espionage trial of 1977 was that of Christopher J. Boyce, 25, and Andrew Daulton Lee, 25. Boyce was a documents clerk with a top secret clearance at TRW Systems, Inc. in Los Angeles. He stole papers which Lee sold to a KGB agent named Boris A. Grishin. Boyce and Lee had grown up in California together. Boyce is the son of an ex-FBI agent who now works for an aerospace firm, and Lee is the son of a wealthy physician.

They were arrested in January 1977: Lee in Mexico City, where he was trying to pass the documents, and Boyce in Riverside, California. Both have since been convicted. Unlike Moore, whose motive for espionage was apparently that of a disgruntled employee, Boyce's motive was tied to his friendship with Lee and the fact that he had learned from his work that the CIA was cheating on an intelligence agreement with Australia. Lee was rebelling in response to his dislike of an American government which had arrested him on drug charges, and a desire for wealth and adventure.\*

Almost all testimony during the Moore trial, including that of CIA officials, was made public, but much of the Boyce trial was withheld because it dealt with TRW's secret contracts with the CIA for intelligence satellites. Traditionally, the CIA has been reluctant to pursue public trials for fear of having its secrets revealed; but in these two trials, the only secret information which came up involved the CIA's finances through the Schroder and Northwest Federal Credit Union connections, an area which the Church Committee had largely neglected. If these two trials succeed in punishing three spies and beginning a thorough illumination of the CIA's questionable financial arrangements, then both American justice and intelligence will have been well served.\*\*

Finally, one might add in argument against an Official Secrets Act, which would have the practical effect of allowing the intelligence community to operate outside the law, that no agent, intelligence officer or source deserves additional protection bought at the expense of the civil rights and liberties of 220 million Americans. The United States does not provide that kind of protection to law-enforcement officials and military personnel, who are expected to risk their lives for their country; none should be given to those in the Armies of Ignorance.

Taken together, the subcommittee's suggestions for an enhanced set of

\*For more on Boyce and Lee, see: Robert Lindsey, "To Be Young, Rich—and a Spy," *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1977.

\*\*Boyce and Lee were convicted on 29 April 1977. See the *New York Times* 30 April 1977.

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statutory power, authorities, and responsibilities for the DCI—or in their terminology, a national intelligence director—causes one to pause and consider not the czarism question but one concerning whether any one man could conceivably handle such an awesome job. It is a question certain to be raised in the public debate over the future of American intelligence. Based on the subcommittee's recommendations and all that they imply, its answer is a simple yes. Nevertheless, these suggestions need to be augmented by two more which are more procedural than substantive: namely, the splitting away of the CIA director's tasks from those of the DCI. This involves appointment of a separate director for the CIA, and the DCI's treating the CIA as one intelligence member of the community with its own role and missions. This has been advocated from time to time but never acted upon; however, if the DCI is going to be given the added tasks set forth in the subcommittee's suggestions, it is absolutely essential that he not be encumbered with direct responsibility for the CIA.

Looking ahead, it is now time to deal with the intelligence community on a functional basis whereby intelligence tasks are assigned on a rational basis, taking account of national intelligence needs as well as those of the departments. To be sure, some overlap and duplication will exist under the best ordered distribution of functions and tasks; that is all to the good if they occur as a result of a genuine effort to find the best mix rather than because of politicking, scare tactics, and false bureaucratic pride. Fortunately, there is a considerable body of organizational theory and models on which such an effort can be properly based.

We don't minimize the controversy explicit in giving the DCI added statutory power over the intelligence community. This will be serious enough, for in some cases it will have to be taken from the secretary of defense, the secretary of state and the president himself. But the subsequent controversies likely to occur when the DCI attempts to assert and implement his new power and authority need not and should not be fought out in a manner designed to pit one intelligence community member against another. The United States neither deserves nor wants such an outcome. It wants a good intelligence system in whose leaders and the effectiveness, propriety, and economy of its activities it can have confidence. This should go without saying, but alas, because considerable power over men and money is at stake, there is a real danger that the debate over the future of American intelligence will be waged on the spurious grounds of personalities and irrelevant issues.

Looking beyond the DCI and intelligence community organizational debates, the future of American intelligence is tied to other features only dimly perceived at this time. It is a different world today than only a few years ago. The Cold War's East-West conflict is only one of many the United States must confront. This requires a broadened intelligence outlook on the part of American intelligence personnel, one designed to take account of a multiplicity of threats to the world order and the United States' interests besides those of